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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At a regular meeting of Cedar City Council on 19 
February, 1953 said City Council duly passed an ordi-
nance entitled "An Ordinance granting to Southern 
Utah Power Company an electric light, heat and power 
franchise .and repealing an ordinance granting to South-
ern Utah Power Company an electric light, heat and 
power franchise dated the 23rd day of March, A. D. 1944." 
This ordinance was duly published in the Iron County 
Record, a newspaper of Ge·neral Circulation in Iron 
County, Utah including the City of Cedar City, Utah on 
the 26th day of February, 1953. By the terms of said or-
dinance it became effective on the 20th day after publi-
cation or the 30th day after final passage, whichever 
was most remote from the date of final passage in com-
pliance with section 10-6-12, U. C. A. 1953. That said Or-
dinance became effective on the 21st day of March, 1953. 
That on the 7th day of March, 1953, 16 days after 
the final passage of said ordi'nance and only 14 days prior 
to the effective date of said ordinance, and 9 days after 
the publication of said ordinance, attorney for the Spon-
sors served upon the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah 
an Application for Petition copies, dated and signed by 
the applicants on the 7th day of March, 1953 as set forth 
in Petitioners "Exhibit B". That this act took place 16 
days after the final passage of said Ordinance. That same 
was receipted for on that date by the City Recorder of Ce-
dar City, Utah as shown by "Defendants Exhibit 1". That 
said application for Petition Copies petitioned and re-
quested that said referendum petition, for the purpose of 
circulation, be divided into 15 sections, each section to 
contain 6 circulation sheets, and to have attached to the 
front sheet thereof, a certified petition copy of said ref-
ere·ndun1 petition copy to be -printed in six-point type, 
single leaded, to be securely bound at the top thereof, in 
the style and form provided by law. 
That in accordance with said request and with Sec-
tion 20-11-13 U. C. A. 1953 the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah on the lOth day of March, 1953 requested bids 
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from 3 competent printers for the printing of said peti-
tion copies and said circulation sheets. That on the same 
date, but after requests for bids had gone to three print-
ers, attorney for the sponsors presented to the City Re-
corder of Cedar City, Utah 15 alleged petition copies for 
her certification and signature and stated that he would 
be back for them in 15 minutes. The City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah requested legal advice on these matters. 
Without waiting for this decision the sponsors com~ 
menced circulating for signatures various documents 
which had never been presented to the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah, which did not bear her signature, Seal, 
or certification, as required by law, which had not been 
prepared. by said City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, 
which the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, had not 
numbered or made a record thereof as required by law 
and had had no opportunity to do so, and which docll-
ments had no force or effect whatsoever. 
That on the 12th day of March, 1953 Sponsors re-
ceived notice to the effect that the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah had been advised not to sign the instru-
ments left with her on the lOth day of March, 1953 by 
and for the reason that they did not substantially con-
form to the statute and that same were available at the 
office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah as set 
forth in "Defendants Exhibit 3." 
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1953 Spon-
sors at the office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah 
accepted deli very of the i terns that had been left with 
the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the lOth day of 
March, 1953. 
That on the 17th day of March, 1953 the City Re-
corder of Cedar City, Utah notified the Sponsors of the 
lowest bid that had been received for the publication of 
the Petition Copies and Circulation sheets as requested 
by the Sponsors and required by law. That said notice is 
set forth in "Defendants Exhibit 4." 
That on the 20th day of March, 1953 J. R. Palmer and 
Orville Isom, Attorney for the Sponsors, delivered to the 
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office of the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah certain 
documents which they represented to be petition copies 
that had been previously circulated, which had never 
been previously exhibited to the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah and which were of no force or effect whatso-
ever. That with said alleged petition copies were two 
certificates prepared by the Sponsors and signed by the 
County Clerk of Iron County, Utah. That the first of these 
certificates is set forth as "Petitioners Exhibit D" and 
the second of same is set forth as "Defendants Exhibit 7." 
That on the 23rd day of March, 1953 the City Record-
er of Cedar City, Utah, after receiving advice from her 
duly authorized council and from the City Council of 
Cedar City, Utah declared said documents insufficient 
for a referendum election as set forth in "Defendants Ex-
hibit 9" and that on the 24th day of March, 1953 duly 
notified the Sponsors of her action. That the receipt of 
said notice is also set forth in "Defendants Exhibit 8." 
That on the 24th day of March, 1953 Sponsors re-· 
quested a recount. That on the 28th day of March, 1953 
Sponsors were notified of the results of the recount and 
invited to have a representative present for a further re-
count. That the Sponsors did not send a representative 
to the further recount. 
That when the items which were delivered to the 
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the 20th day of 
April, 1953 were on that date checked in the office of the 
Clerk of Iron County, Utah that a deputy of the clerk 
was present but that the Sponsors did any checking that 
might have been done that day and that a sponsor or a 
representative of the sponsor made all marks that were 
made on the alleged petition copies. That after so doing 
the County Clerk merely signed the certificates previous-
ly prepared by the sponsors. That said county clerk 
signed same in the presence of the Attorney for Spo·nsors 
who had been present and participated in the checking 
that was done on said alleged petition copies. 
That on the 30th day of March, 1953, 9 days after 
the Ordinance in question had become effective, the 
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Sponsors delivered to the City Recorder of Cedar City, 
Utah a Certificate fron1 the County Clerk of Iron County, 
Utah as set forth in "Petitioners Exhibit E-1" which pur-
ported to supplement the former certificate. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Before a writ of Mandamus will issue there must 
be be shown a clear right to the relief sought and a clear 
duty of performance resting on the one whom it is sought 
to compel to do the act. 
2. That the instrument presented to the City Record-
er of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 was of no force 
or effect whatsoever and placed no duty upon the City 
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah · or any other official of 
Cedar City, Utah. 
3. That a supplementary certificate submitted 9 days 
after the effective date of an ordinance cannot have any 
effect on said ordinance being effective. 
4. That the said certificate, purporting to supplement 
a former act of the sponsors, only added to the confusion 
and made it more difficult for the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah to determine the number of qualified voters, 
if any, on said alleged Petition Copies. 
ARGUMENT 
1. It is a well established rule established over a long 
period that "Mandamus will issue only where there is a 
clear right to the relief sought and a clear duty of per-
formance resting on the one whom it is sought to compel 
to do the act." This is upheld in the Utah cases decided 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah over a consid-
erable period of time. A few of the Utah Authorities on 
this item are as follows: Board of Education of Ogden 
City vs. A·nderson, 74 Pac. (2d) 681, 93 Utah 522 which 
holds as follows: 
The right to require a person or a court to proceed 
and legal duty to do so must be free from doubt, oth-
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erwise remedy by writ of Mandamus must be denied. 
Colorado Development Co. vs. Creer, 80 Pac. (2d) 685, 96, 
Utah 1 holds as follows: 
In Mandamus, the plaintiff must show plain right 
for which the law gives no adequate remedy, except 
Mandamus, and duty in defendants to perform a 
ministerial act, including a showing of authority, 
ability and means to perform that act. 
Harris vs. Turner, 85 Pac. (2d) 824, 96 Utah 342 holds: 
Whenever action by a court or other officer is sought 
to be compelled by Mandamus, it must be shown that 
there . is a clear legal duty to act as requested, free 
from doubt, imperative, and without discretion to 
act or refuse. 
This view is upheld by ·neighboring jurisdictions in the 
following cases Grable vs. Childers, 56 Pac. (2d) 357, 176 
Okl. 360; McDo·nald vs. Pritzl, 93 Pac. (2d) 11, 60 Idaho 
354; State ex rei. Conklin vs. Buckingham, 83 Pac. (2d) 
462, 58 Nevada 450; and State ex rei. Moore vs. Nan Tas-
sel Real Estate & Livestock Co., 79 Pac. (2d) 276, 53 
Wyo. 89 
In the present case being considered there is no 
showing of any right for the relief sought nor is there 
any showing of any duty of performance resting on the 
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah or any other official 
of Cedar City, Utah. 
2. The facts as stipulated and the law governing Ref-
erendum Petitions in cities in the state of Utah show def-
initely that the instrument presented to the City Record-
er of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953, alleged to be 
a Refere·ndum Petition, was of no force or effect what-
soever and placed ·no duty upon the City Recorder of 
Cedar City or any other official of Cedar City, Utah. 
The basic law in the state of Utah stems from Arti-
cle VI, Section 1, Subsection 2 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah which clearly places upon the legislature 
of the state of Utah a duty to state what percentage of 
the people of a city may initiate a Referendum on an Or· 
dinance of said city and also places a duty on said legis· 
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Iature to state the manner and time in which said Refer-
endum may be had. In response to this Constitutional Re-
quirement the legislature has enacted Chapter 11, Title 
20 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, consisting of 25 
sections \Vhich is the la\v as required by said constitu-
tional provision that states the proportion of the people 
that may cause a referendum of a city Ordinance and the 
time and manner in \vhich same can be performed. The 
Sponsors have stated in their brief to the effect that this 
is very unsatisfactory legislation concerni'ng this rna tter 
of Referendum in cities. However there is no question to 
the effect that this is not the legislation that governs Ref-
erendum in cities and while the Sponsors in the case at 
hand may not approve of the legislation never the less 
said Sponsors, and the City Officials of Cedar City, Utah, 
are admittedly bound by this legislation, and must con-
form to this legislation for a Referendum and are not 
allowed to initiate a proceeding of their own for this 
matter. 
Our basic law is well settled to the effect that there 
is no authority for Initiative and Refere·ndum procedures 
in cities except as stated by Constitution, Statute, or 
Charter. It is also well settled that where so stated by 
Constitution, Statute, or Charter, that the Initiative and 
Referendum procedure therein stated is exclusive and 
Mandatory. For the basic law on this matter see 43 Cor-
pus Juris, at page 583, Section 946. ORDINANCES UN-
DER INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAWS, and 
conti'nuing sections thereafter, as follows: 
Section 948. Source of Power. Unless authorized by 
organic law or by charter or general statute, a mu-
nicipal council is without authority to pass ordi-
nances providing for a referendum of any kind. 
Section 950. Method of Exercising Power. The meth-
od of exercising initiative and refere·ndum powers 
must conform to, and comply with, the mode pre-
sented in the constitution or statute conferring the 
power. 
Section 956. Petition, in General. The petition must 
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comply in all respects with the statutory require-
ments, which are construed as being mandatory. A 
petition. which measures up to this standard is suffi-
cient. 
Section 956. Amendments. An insufficient petition 
for a referendum cannot be amended after the ordi-
nance has gone into effect, and does not necessarily 
operate to suspend the ordinance. 
Section 959. Time of Filing. After the time limited 
for filing a petition has expired a defective peti-
tion cannot be amended and such amendments are of 
no effect to suspend the ordinance. 
In view of this the action of Sponsors in entirely ignor-
ing the statutory procedure and initiating a procedure 
that substatially differs from that set forth in the stat-
ute that produced an unofficial document of no force or 
effect whatsoever. As a matter of fact that Sponsors 
waited until they had only 14 days in which to accomp-
lish the statutory procedure and then violated the man-
datory statutory procedures in substantial ways and 
have now brought this mandamus proceeding asking the 
Supreme Court of the state of Utah to require the City 
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah to endorse a referendum 
procedure that materially differs with mandatory statu-
tory requirements and place on a ballot a Unofficial Ref-
erendum. In view of the long established authority that 
these statutory proceedings are mandatory there can be 
no conclusion on this rna tter except to deny the Petition 
and order the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah not to 
put said Unofficial Referendum on the ballot. 
That the procedure of the Sponsors did not substan-
tially comply with the statutes of the state of Utah can-
not be denied by the Sponsors. After presenting to the 
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, their Application for 
Petition Copies specifically requesting that the statute 
be complied with the Sponsors apparently immediately 
ordered pri'nted their own version of the Petition. On 10 
March, 1953 this was presented to the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah for signature. She took time to obtain 
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legal counsel on this matter and without waiting for her 
decision the Sponsors commenced circulation of a spuri-
ous and unofficial document that the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah had never seen and had never had the 
opportunity to see. At this point an unanswered question 
that this writer has it this, "If the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah had signed the matters presented to her, how 
would the Sponsors have gotten the signature they had 
already obtained upon the circulation sheets attached to 
the Petition Copies signed by the City Recorder?" Of 
course this answer lies with the Sponsors and not with 
this writer, but the Sponsors have stipulated that they 
circulated the sheets presented to the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah on 20th :r,iarch, 1953 prior to the re-
ceipt of notice from the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah 
that the items left with her on 10 March, 1953 would not 
be signed. If the Sponsors had not commenced the cir-
culation for signatures of some unofficial document prior 
to the receipt of notice that the alleged copies left with 
the City Recorder on 10 March, 1953 would not be signed 
they should have brought an action for Mandamus at 
that time. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
so held in the case of Coleman vs. Bench, 84 Pac. (2d) 
412, 96 Utah 1943 as follows: 
The processes of initiatio·n and referendum are ex-
posed to act of judiciary at certain points along the 
way because they are not in control of a single 
agency, but depend on certain ministerial officers 
doing their duty, and, therefore, resort may be had 
to judiciary for mandamus for purpose of enforcing 
processes of initiation which might not be enforced 
in any other way. 
This writer cannot understand the total disregard of the 
Sponsors for commencing circulation for signature of un-
official spurious documents without waiting for the de-
cision of the City Recorder, and certainly had they wait-
ed for the decision of the City Recorder a·nd had been 
unsatisfied with said decision their remedy should have 
been a resort to mandamus at that time and not the cir-
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cula tion of unofficial, uncertified, spurious documents of 
no legal effect whatsoever. 
But the fact of the matter is that the Sponsors con-
doned and approved the action of the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah and continued the circulation of said 
unofficial, uncertified, spurious documents of no legal 
effect whatsoever and presented to the City Recorder 
of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 a document 
which said Sponsors allege to be a good and sufficient 
Refere·ndum Petition even though it had never been pre-
viously seen by the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah, 
and even though she had never had an opportunity to see 
said document and even though she had never had an op-
portunity to do those things by law required of her to be 
done in connection with a Petition for Referendum. 
Therefore the questions actually before the court 
are not concerning the action of the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah in connection with the matters present-
ed to her on 10 March, 1953 but are questions concerning 
the validity of the document presented to said City Re-
corder on 20 March, 1953 and its sufficiency as a Petition 
· for Refendum. 
The defendants contend that same was not a valid 
Document and that same was insufficient for a Petition 
for Referendum for the following reasons: 
I. Their is no question but that the Constitution of 
the State of Utah and Chapter 11 of Title 20 of U.C.A. 
1953 control this matter. The p .. :·eviously cited matters in 
Corpus Juris state the existing law in relation to substan-
tial compliance with the law being mandatory This has 
been upheld in the case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, City Re-
corder, 117 Pac. (2d) 287, as follows: 
This is so because while, Section 25-10-23 (now 20-11-
23) prescribes that the manner of exercising the ref-
erendum powers reserved to the people of cities and 
towns shall be "similar" to the procedure prescribed 
for state ini tia ti ve and referendum the deviation, if 
any other than that elsewhPre expressed in the 
statute, which might be suggested by the use of the 
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word "similiar", is limited by the other provision 
of such section wherein is expressed legislative in-
tention to make the procedure in referring a munici-
pal ordinance "as nearly as practicable" the same a~ 
that prescribed f<?r reference of an act of the legis-
lature. 
This very definitely established that substantial com-
pliance with the statutes of the state of Utah is required 
for the production of an effective Referendum Petition. 
II. In the case at hand the Provisions of Law relat-
ing to Referendum Procedure, and the Conditions prece-
dent to the Acceptance, by the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah, of the Alleged Petitiou copies had not been 
complied with in the following particulars: 
A. The Alleged Petition Copies presented to the City 
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah had never beeri printed 
under the authority or directions of the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah as required by law. 
Section 20-11-13, U.C.A. 1953 puts a number of duties 
on the City Recorder in a City Referendum, to-wit: to 
determine the number of petition copies desired, to de-
termine the number of circulation sheets required, solicit 
bids from not less than three competent printers for the 
petition copies and circulation sheets and for the print-
ing of the certificate that the title of the ordinance con-
tained thereon is the true and correct number of the title 
of this law as proposed for ref~rendum, notification of 
the lowest and best bid received, the payment of the bid 
for the printing of the petition copies and. of the sum of 
50 cents per hundred for the circulation sheets, making 
up the petition copies. Of the items thus required of the 
City Recorder not one had bee·n performed by the City 
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah on the spurious and un-
official document delivered to her office by the Sponsors 
on 20 March, 1953. Certainly the Sponsors do not contend 
that this section of the law has been substantially com-
plied with. Certainly leaving of the certificate required 
by this section is not substantial compliance with the 
law on this matter. In this section of the statute there is 
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shown a legislative intent that a person asked to sign a 
petition may have the assurance that same is the correct 
number arid title of the Ordinance. Can this assurance 
be given if the certificate to this effect is left off entirely. 
Sponsors contend that they have the right to have 
these petition copies printed to suit theirself. Is that 
the legislative. intent of the statutes on this n1atter? Do 
these statutes at any place state to the effect that if the 
Sponsors sleep on their rights until such time as the time 
is very short on this rna tter then and in that case they 
may bypass the statute and prepare some document to 
their own satisfaction and then circulate same and rep-
resent that it is an official act of the City Recorder of 
Cedar City, Utah and that same is an official Document? 
Certainly this action was not the intent of the legislature 
at the time the statute was adopted nor is it the intent 
of Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
In their brief the Sponsors contend that that por-
tion of the statute requiring the bids is for their protec-
tion. Is that the case. Sponsors cite 56 Am. Jur. Page 109 
for their authority fn this matter. Continuing the citation 
of the Sponsors we find as follows: 
Because requirements of a statute enacted for the 
public good may not be nullified or varied by private 
contract, the donee of a private right created by 
statute for the public good does not have the legal 
power to make an anticipant waiver of such right. 
56 Am. Jur. 115. Intention to Relinquish. A prerequi-
cite ingredient of the waiver of a right or privilege 
consists of an intention to relinquish it. No man can 
be bound by a waiver of his rights, unless such wai-
ver is distinctly made, with full knowledge of the 
rights which he intends to waive and that fact that 
he knows his rights, and intends to waive them, 
must plainly appear. As in other situations the ques-
tion whether waiver will be found in any particular 
case depends not upon the secret information of the 
party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect 
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which his conduct has had upon the other party. 
There is no waiver unless the waiver is so intended 
by one party and so accepted by the other. 
Can it be said that the Sponsors had any rights in this 
matter that they could waive. Certainly if they had any 
rights that they might waive the delivery to the City Re-
corder of Cedar City, Utah of a written application for 
Petition Copies in conformity with the law cannot now 
be construed as an intention to waive any rights under 
the law. Also if the Sponsors had any rights in this mat-
ter they must of necessity be a right in connection with 
a public good and cannot be waived therefor. Thus the 
statement of the Sponsors to the effect that they waived 
their rights, if any, after failing to comply with the stat-
ute in a substantial manner, after requesting the City Re- · 
corder, in writing, to comply with said statute seems to 
present the Sponsors in inconsistent positions. Can any 
person request that a law be complied with, then fail to 
substantially comply with the same law and make sub-
stantial changes in the contents of the item they have 
just requested be furnished to them in compliance with 
the law, and then take the position that they have waived 
their rights? Or is compliance with the law to be deemed 
a matter of convenience. 
B. The Alleged Petition Copies that were circulated 
for signatures were never signed by, or issued by the 
City Recorder as required by law, and no record thereof 
was kept in the City Recorder's office, a·nd said Alleged 
Petition Copies and circulation sheets were wholly un-
official and void. 
The Sponsors have stipulated that the items present-
ed to the City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah had never 
been previously seen by her, or previously presented to 
her. Is this substantial compliance with the statute. Did 
the statute intend that the City Recorder should prepare 
these petition Copies, and circulation sheets, a·nd keep a 
record of them, and have them go out for signature as 
official documents under her certificate and seal or did 
the statute intend that any one that felt so inclined 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
might prepare and put out for circulation and signature 
any document and represent that this is a referendum 
petition? Did the statute intend that any one that de-
sired might take a blank sheet of paper and circulate for 
signature and state that this is a referendum petition on 
some sort of a subject? Absurd! Of course this conten-
tion is absurd. But it is exactly what has happened in 
this case. It is certainly ·not possible that this is what 
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides for when 
it states "within such manner and within such time as 
may be provided by law." Certainly there is no intent in 
our constitution of any sort of a referendum petition 
bei'ng circulated for signature except as provided by law. 
Certainly there is no intent in our statute of petitions 
being printed independently of the City Recorder and 
being completely circulated for signature without the 
certificates required by law, without the signature of the 
city recorder required by law. Is this circulation of a 
spurious, unofficial, and unlawful document substantial 
compliance with the statue. These defects are not defects 
of form but are material and substa·ntial defects that con-
not be overlooked. 
C. The Alleged Petition Copies and Circulation sheets 
were wholly unofficial and unauthorized when circulated 
for signature. 
There is no authority for the preparation of Petition 
Copies a·nd Circulation Sheets as in this case prepared 
by the Sponsors. The statute is definite that this is the 
duty of the City Recorder. For the Sponsors simply to 
print and circulate same without regard to the require-
ments of the statute was certainly not contemplated by 
the Constitution of the State of Utah nor the statute 
controlling this function. 
D. The alleged Petition Copies and Circulatio·n Sheets 
when construed in the light of the formula set-forth in 
the sworn certificate of the County Clerk of Iron Coun-
ty, contained the signatures of no registered voters of 
Iron County. 
The controlling I a w on this rna tter in this jurisdic-
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tion is the case of Halgreen vs. Welling 63 Pac. (2d) 550, 
which has been affirmed by Allen vs. Rasmussen, 117 
Pac. (2d) 287. The Halgreen vs. \Veiling case holds: 
We think that the statute is cl~ar that the clerk 
should indicate by appropriate marks, explained, or 
by words such as "registered" or "not registered" 
or the equivalent thereof by abbreviations or other-
wise so the Secretary of State can determine from an 
inspection of the petition copies "whether or not each 
name is that of a registered voter." 
The county clerks are required to certify that the 
signers are or are not registered voters. The Secre-
tary of State is to determine how many qualified 
registered voters have signed the petition-it is a 
matter of counting qualified registered voters' names 
on the assembled petition copies. 
The Secretary was without the necessary informa-
tion and therefore without jurisdiction to say that 
he had "received, counted, and found sufficient" the 
number of qualified signers on the iniative petition 
as a whole. The names could be counted, but it could 
not be determined whether they were qualified 
signers. Only qualified signers make a "sufficient" 
petition. 
By taking this formula, that the certificate of the county 
clerk as to the number of qualified voters cannot be con-
sidered by the City Recorder but she must make an inde-
pendent verification of the number of qualified voters 
based upon the formula of the County Clerk we reach 
an amazing result with the case at hand. The certificate 
of the County Clerk as shown in "Defendants' Exhibit 7" 
states "And I further certify that I have indicated such 
names appearing thereon as are registered voters in 
Cedar City, Utah, by placing before each of said names 
a check in the column where the name of such registered 
voter appears; I further certify that all the names on said 
sheets not marked with a check either are not registered 
voters in Cedar City or are the names concerning which 
I have some question which prevented my certifying 
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that they are registered voters in Cedar City, Utah." 
Examination of the spurious document \Vhich accom-
panied said certificate reveals that in front of the names 
of the supposed signers are various numbers, behind said 
names are various marks, including five different types 
and styles of check marks, some crosses, some circles, 
and many without a mark of any kind. Examination re-
veals that there are some that have no marks in front. 
When the City Recorder makes an independent applica-
tion of the formula of the county clerk she can arrive at 
only one result. That there is not a registered voter of 
Cedar City, Utah with signature on said alleged petition 
copies. 
On the 30th day of March, 1953 the Sponsors con-
firmed the finding of the City Recorder of Cedar City, 
Utah by submitting a Supplementary Certificate on the 
same subject. This certificate is identical except it states 
that the check marks are behi'nd the names. It also states 
that it is a certificate to supplement the original certifi-
cate. This supplementary certificate is set forth in "Pe-
titioner's Exhibit E-1''. Certainly if the original certifi-
cate was correct and merely applied wrongly by the City 
Recorder of Cedar City, Utah then there would have been 
no need to submit the supplementary certificate. Remem-
bering that the certificate sub1nitted 30 March, 1953 
states that it is supplementary to the certificate of 20 
March, 1953 it does not clarify the subject, if it could be 
accepted, but further confuses same a·nd makes it that 
much harder to get a determination. The original cereifi-
cate states that the check marks are in front. A supple-
ment thereto merely states that they are behind and that 
this is a supplementary certificate. Which Certificate is 
correct? One does not correct the other but by its con-
tents merely supplements the other. Construing the two 
together is there any way that a City Recorder or any 
other official can determine the number of registered 
voters on the Alleged Petition Copies? Are the check 
marks behind or in front? Which certificate is correct. 
What effect does a supplementary certificate that states· 
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something contrary to the certificate it supplements have 
on the original certificate? These are the questions that 
the City Recorder is expected to answer. These are the 
questions that the City Recorder would have to a·nswer 
prior to a determination of the number of registered vot-
ers on the alleged petition copies. With the information 
thus available she cannot determine the number of reg-
istered voters on the alleged petition copies and therefor 
there could be no change in her result co·ncerning the 
number of voters and concerning the sufficiency of said 
alleged petition copies. 
The sponsors cite a California case on this matter to 
the effect that the late certificate can be 'Considered by 
the City Recorder. The case that they cite, Willett vs. 
Jordan, Secretary of State, 53 Pac (2d) 1025 is on a stat-
ute entirely different than our statute. In the Ca~ifornia 
statute the county clerk is required to determine the 
actual number of registered voters on each petition copy 
and so certify. Our statute reqnires the county clerk to 
identify the registered voters and the City Recorder to 
make the determination of number based on this identifi-
cation. The statutes involved are entirely differe·nt. Es-
pecially significant in this matter is 43 Corpus Juris 589 
concerning amendments which reads as follows: 
As insufficient petition for a referendum cannot be 
amended after the ordi'nance has gone into effect, 
and does not necessarily operate to suspend the or-
dinance. 
Of greater interest to this jurisdiction is the case of Allen 
vs. Rasmussen, 117 Pac. (2d) 287, which reads as follows. 
The time when it is obligatory to have before the fil-
ing officer a sufficient petition to require submission 
has been by the legislature keyed to the effective 
date of such law, absent such a petition then filed. 
But here we are asked to vary the procedure clearly 
indica ted by the legislature in such a way as to de-
feat some of its salutary features. This we are not at 
liberty to do. 
Thus in the Allen vs Rasmussen case the Supreme Court 
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of the State of Utah clearly holds that it is necessary for 
a sufficient petition to be filed prior to the time that the 
ordinance becomes effective. This the Sponsors admit 
that they have not done because 9 days after the ordin-
ance became effective the Sponsors felt that it was ne-
cessary to submit a supplementary certificate on the 
matter. 
Sponsors contend that the City Recorder had a duty 
to notify them of the Insufficiency in time to correct 
same. This is not necessarily true. On this subject 43 
Corpus Juris 591 states: 
Time of certification. Although the statute does not 
fix the time within which certification must be made, 
this duty must be performed within a reasonable 
time. 
Now the question of what is a reasonable time as answer-
ed in 102 A.L.R. 51 to the effect that 5 days from the 
time a petition was submitted until it was set for hearing 
concerning its sufficiency was reasonable and that 10 
days was reasonable. The same annotation indicates that 
30 days has been held reasonable. In the case at hand the 
Sponsors contend that an Alleged Petition submitted in 
the Ia te afternoon of 20 March, 1953, actually determined 
by the City Recorder to be insufficient on 23 March, 1953 
of which said Sponsors received notice on 24 March, 1953 
is an unreasonable period of time for the determination 
and that there was a duty to make a detern1ination so 
that they could remedy the defects prior to the ordin-
ance becoming effective 21 March, 1953. Certainly the 
above. quoted authority on this subject does not consider 
a time of three days in arriving at the determination of 
sufficiency an unreasonable length of time. 
E. The Alleged Petition Copies did not contain the 
Certificate required by Section 20-11-12, U.C.A. 1953 
This section contemplates that each Petition Copy 
circulated shall have a certificate to the effect that it is 
a full, true and correct copy of said Petition. This was not 
done nor was there an opportunity to do so. The Spon-
sors have admitted circulating alleged Petition Copies 
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that the City Recorder had never seen or never had an 
opportunity to see, and Sponsors have Stipulated to the 
effect that this was done prior to the receipt of the no-
tice on 12 March, 1953 that others would not be signed. 
This means that the items circulated for signature may 
or may not have been correct Petition Copies. Certainly 
this was not and is not the intent of the legislative act 
controlling Referendum and certainly this is a mandatory 
requirement. 
F. The alleged Petition Copies and Circulation sheets 
were not printed in 6 point type as required by Section 
20-11-13, U.C.A. 1953. 
There is not a question but that this is one of the re-
quirements of the statute. The Sponsors have stipulated 
that this was not complied with. This seems to be in the 
spirit of the entire action of the Sponsors in this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Therefore Defendants are convinced and argue that 
the Plaintiffs' action for a writ of mandamus should not 
be allowed for the following reasons: 
1. That the plaintiffs have fai~ed to show a clear 
right to the relief sought and have failed to show a duty 
of performance resting on the City Recorder of Cedar 
City, Utah or any other official of Cedar City, Utah. 
2. That the instrume·nt presented to the City Re-
corder of Cedar City, Utah on 20 March, 1953 was of no 
force or effect whatsoever and placed no duty upon the 
City Recorder of Cedar City, Utah or any other official 
of Cedar City, Utah. 
3. That a Supplementary certificate submitted 9 
days after the effective date of an Ordinance cannot have 
any effect on said ordinance being effective. 
4. That substa·ntial compliance with the Constitution 
of the State of Utah and the statutes of the State of Utah 
governing the procedure for Referendum of a city Ordin-
ance is a prerequisite of a valid referendum petition and 
failure to substantially comply with same prevents the 
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alleged referendum petition from being effective, and 
failure to substantially comply with same will not pre-
vent said ordinance from becoming effective. 
5. That because of the failure of the Sponsors to 
substantially comply with the Constitutional and statu-
tory requirements concerning a municipal referendum 
the Ordinance in question became effective on the 21st. 
day of March, 1953. 
PATRICK H. FENTON, 
Cedar City, Utah. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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